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The current state of qualified immunity allows victims’ constitutional 
rights to be violated but not vindicated. The judicially created doctrine of 
qualified immunity has been strongly supported by the Supreme Court. 
Recently, opposition has increased from legal commentators, members of 
Congress, and judges across political and ideological lines. This Note 
analyzes qualified immunity and proposes bringing the doctrine back in line 
with its common-law foundation.  Watson proposes reinstating the original 
applicability of § 1983 and returning to a common-law understanding of 
qualified immunity. Watson advocates for keeping officials accountable 
while protecting officials from burdensome litigation, and better serving 
justice for those whose rights have been violated.  
 
*   J.D. (2020), Washington University School of Law. 



















On July 15, 2012, at 1:30 a.m., Andrew Lee Scott was home watching 
TV with his girlfriend, Miranda Mauck.1 Someone banged on the door, 
alarming Andrew and Miranda.2 Andrew retrieved his gun and 
investigated.3 When he opened the door, a hidden figure drew its weapon 
and opened fire.4 Andrew was shot several times and fell to the floor—
dead.5 
The unannounced, hidden figure was a police officer looking for a 
person other than Andrew, but the officer was at the wrong house.6 In fact, 
the officer didn’t even have a search warrant for the correct house.7 Nor did 
he indicate he was law enforcement before firing; he did not use emergency 
lights or make an identifying statement.8 
An innocent man left dead in his own home. 
Nevertheless, the officer evaded liability. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling that gave the officer immunity 
because his actions did not violate “clearly established law.”9 In legal terms, 
it granted the officer qualified immunity. 
The Supreme Court strongly supports qualified immunity, a judicially 
created doctrine. In recent years, the Court has sent a clear message: There 
should be fewer lawsuits against government officers, specifically law 
enforcement.10 The Court’s emphasis on qualified immunity has “been 
 
1.   Ludmilla Lelis, Federal Lawsuit Filed Against Lake Sheriff for Andrew Lee Scott Shooting 
Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL, (Mar. 6, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-03-06/news/os-
andrew-scott-shooting-lawsuit-20130306_1_andrew-lee-scott-leesburg-man-shot-excessive-force 
[https://perma.cc/2HPA-HJ5L]. 
2.   Id. 
3.   Id. 
4.   Id. 
5.   Id. 
6.   David French, End Qualified Immunity, NATIONAL REVIEW (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/09/end-qualified-immunity-supreme-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/BR57-ZWS9]. 
7.   Id. 
8.   Id. 
9.   Young v. Borders, 620 F. App’x 889 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curium); see also Young v. Borders, 
No. 5:13-cv-113-Oc-22PRL, 2014 WL 11444072 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2014). 
10.   Noah Feldman, Supreme Court has had Enough with Police Suits, BLOOMBERG OPINION, 



















emphatic, frequent, longstanding, and nonideological.”11 But  modern 
qualified immunity has come under increasing pressure from legal 
commentators,12 members of Congress,13 judges,14 and even Justices on the 
Court.15 Just as the Court’s embrace of qualified immunity has been 
nonideological, the growing chorus of voices opposed to modern qualified 
immunity is undefined by politics or ideology. 
Modern qualified immunity is too broad for its intended purposes and 
fails to secure justice for people like Andrew Lee Scott. This Note proposes 
that Congress and the Supreme Court work together to bring qualified 
immunity into check and back in line with its common-law foundation. 
Part I of this Note follows the history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and qualified 
immunity. Starting with the passage of § 1983, it discusses the Court’s role 
in expanding federal jurisdiction over civil-rights suits and the Court’s 
creation of qualified immunity. It then examines the Court’s myriad 
explanations for adopting and strengthening qualified immunity. 
Part II analyzes the impact of two of the Court’s most influential cases 
involving § 1983 and qualified immunity. It first considers the Court’s 
interpretation of § 1983’s scope and suggests that the Court created a new 
understanding of § 1983 almost a century after it was passed into law. Then, 
 
11.   Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1858 (2018). Unanimous qualified-immunity decisions have been authored 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Alito, Ginsburg, and Thomas. Id. 
12.   See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 88 (2018) 
(concluding that qualified immunity “lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are 
unpersuasive”); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 76 (2017) 
[hereinafter Schwartz, How QI Fails] (reasoning that “available evidence indicates that qualified 
immunity often is not functioning as [the Court] assumed, and is not achieving its intended goals”).  
13.   A bill was offered in the United States House of Representatives to do away with qualified 
immunity in the wake of George Floyd’s death at the hands of Minneapolis police officers. The bill is 
sponsored by a tri-partisan group of sixty-five Representatives. Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 
7085, 116th Cong. (2020). And two competing bills have been offered in the Senate. Ending Qualified 
Immunity Act, S. 4142, 116th Cong. (2020); Reforming Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4036, 116th Cong. 
(2020). 
14.   See, e.g., Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante) (“To 
some observers, qualified immunity smacks of unqualified impunity, letting public officials duck 
consequences for bad behavior—no matter how palpably unreasonably—as long as they were the first 
to behave badly.”). 
15.   See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The 
Court’s] one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for 
law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 
S. Ct. 1843, 1871–72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[O]ur 
analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 
Act . . . . In an appropriate case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”). 

















it examines the Court’s formulation of modern qualified immunity and 
asserts that the Court has drifted far from common-law principles and 
should return to the original understanding of qualified immunity. 
 
I.  HISTORY 
 
In 1868, the United States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.16 The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after the Civil War 
to guarantee the rights of former slaves and fight the racial injustices of 
Black Codes—slavery by another name.17 To achieve these goals, the 
amendment gave Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of” the amendment.18 Congress used this power 
to enact section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.19 It allowed all citizens 
to sue a government agent for violating their rights, but it was predominately 
passed to allow former slaves to vindicate their newly found constitutional 
and legal rights.20 
The modern successor to the Act is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21 Section 1983 
allows anyone who has been deprived “of any rights, privileges, or 
 
16.   Amendment XIV, Section 1 provides in relevant part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
17.   Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 31, 42 
(2015). Black Codes provided a pittance of basic rights (e.g., marriage and ownership) to the formerly 
enslaved Americans in an attempt to skirt constitutional issues but denied them most other rights, 
“including the right to bear arms, to serve on juries, to vote, to testify against whites in court, to quit 
their jobs while under contract, and to move about without proof of a labor contract with some 
employer.” James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and Incidents of 
Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426, 436 (2018). 
18.   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. 
19.   Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017)). 
Since 1871, the cause of action now codified at § 1983 has been in several different locations in the 
United States Code. I will thus refer to the various iterations of the legislation as § 1983 throughout this 
Note even if the statute was, at the time, located elsewhere. 
20.   Howard M. Wasserman, Teaching Civil Rights: Civil Rights and Federal Courts: Creating a 
Two-Course Sequence, 54 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 821, 821 (2010); see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 505 (1871) (statement of Sen. Pratt) (“Though called citizens of the United States, nobody can 
doubt that special reference was had to those who had been heretofore slaves. It was not needed that 
these provisions should be made for the white race, whose citizenship had never been in doubt.”). 


















immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” to bring suit against 
anyone acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State.”22 Although the statute does not explicitly mention any 
immunities,23 the Supreme Court has carved out a broad qualified immunity 
that shields government officials who have not violated “clearly established 
law.”24 
The first major shift in § 1983 doctrine occurred almost one hundred 
years after its enactment when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. 
Pape.25 In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police officers entered Monroe’s home 
without a search warrant, “routed [his family] from bed, made them stand 
naked in the living room, . . . ransacked every room,” and arrested him.26 
The officers were not acting pursuant to any Illinois statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage,27 but Monroe sued in federal court under § 
1983.28 The question was whether § 1983’s “under color of any [state law]” 
language allowed suits against state officials who deprived an individual of 
rights in violation of state law or whether the language limited suits to cases 
where officials acted in accordance with “state law, state custom, or state 
 
22.   42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). The full statute reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District 
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
Id. 
An equivalent cause of action against federal officers was created by common law in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Although the two actions 
have different origins, the Supreme Court analyzes qualified immunity identically under Bivens and § 
1983. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (“[U]nder both § 1983 and Bivens, the qualified 
immunity analysis is identical . . . .”). 
23.   Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (explaining that § 1983 “on its face admits no 
immunities”). 
24.   Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
25.   Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
26.   Id. at 169. 
27.   Id. at 172. 
28.   Id. at 169. 

















usage.”29 The Monroe Court chose the former construction—opening the 
federal courts to a greater number of potential litigants whose rights were 
violated by state officials even when the state official violated state law.30 
The Court again made a major shift in Harlow v. Fitzgerald and crafted 
the modern qualified-immunity test.31 Before Harlow, qualified immunity 
had a subjective and objective prong, both had to be met for the defendant 
to be granted qualified immunity.32 The subjective prong of the pre-Harlow 
test denied qualified immunity if an official “took the action with the 
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury.”33 Because of the difficulty and litigation costs of proving subjective 
intent, the Court argued that denying qualified immunity based on officials’ 
subjective good faith imposed substantial costs on officials such as 
distracting them from their duties, inhibiting officials’ discretion, and 
deterring qualified citizens from serving.34 Then, the Court announced the 
modern qualified-immunity test, which contains only an objective prong: 
State-government officials “generally are shielded . . . insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”35 
Next, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court set forth the most recent piece 
of qualified-immunity doctrine.36 In Pearson, Callahan gave an undercover 
police informant consent to enter his home to buy methamphetamine.37 
After the purchase and while still in the home, the informant signaled the 
task force, which entered Callahan’s home and arrested him.38 He was 
 
29.   Id. at 172. 
30.   Id. at 187. But see id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative history, 
litigation history, and the plain language all “converge[] to the conclusion that . . . [§1983 is] enforceable 
in the federal courts only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts because 
some ‘statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage’ sanctioned the grievance complained of”); see 
George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of State Law: An Essay on the Forgotten 
Terms of Section 1983, 89 VA. L. REV. 925, 964 (2003) (reasoning that the Monroe majority interpreted 
“under color of” broadly to define any state action so “there was no need to embark upon the difficult 
and fact-intensive inquiry into whether the state officials had created their own customary form of state 
law”). 
31.   Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
32.   Id. at 815. 
33.   Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). 
34.   Id. at 816. 
35.   Id. at 818 (emphasis added). 
36.   Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
37.   Id. at 227–28. 


















charged with unlawful possession and distribution of methamphetamine.39 
The Court reasoned that the “consent-once-removed” doctrine, which 
allows police to enter a house when an informant gains consent, was widely 
accepted by lower courts, so the task force reasonably relied on that doctrine 
even though it violated the Fourth Amendment.40 It held that the qualified-
immunity inquiry “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, 
assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it 
was taken.’”41 Furthermore, and most importantly, the Court allowed lower 
courts to first determine if there was a violation of clearly established law, 
and then, if there was, ask whether there was a constitutional violation.42 
Thus, if a court decides to grant qualified immunity because there is no 
violation of clearly established law, it may never answer whether there was 
a constitutional violation. 
Qualified immunity has been described as “the most important doctrine 
in the law of constitutional torts.”43 Given the doctrine’s importance, one 
might assume that the Supreme Court has strong justifications for creating 
the doctrine despite the fact that Congress did not set forth any immunity in 
§ 1983’s text. In upholding the doctrine, the Supreme Court has proffered 
practical concerns and four legal theories: common-law good faith, 
equilibrium adjustment,44 lenity, and stare decisis. 
 
A.  Practical Concerns 
 
The Supreme Court’s practical justifications for qualified immunity rest 
on balancing “two important interests—the need to hold public officials 
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 
duties reasonably.”45 
Originally, the Court focused on shielding officials from financial 
 
39.   Id. 
40.   Id. at 244. 
41.   Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)). 
42.   Id. at 239. 
43.   John C. Jefferies, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 
(2010). 
44.   See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (describing equilibrium adjustment as “a judicial response to changing” 
circumstances “to restore the prior equilibrium”). 
45.   Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 

















liability.46 The Court explained that a “policeman’s lot is not so unhappy 
that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he 
does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages 
if he does.”47 Protecting officials from financial liability is consistent with 
qualified immunity’s application because the doctrine does not extend to 
“municipalities, . . . some private actors, and claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief.”48 
Fifteen years after first expressing concern with financial liability, 
however, the Court emphasized broader practical concerns for qualified 
immunity. Harlow identified three costs other than financial liability that 
qualified immunity protects officials from.49 These concerns are: distracting 
officials from public issues, deterring citizens from accepting public office, 
and causing officers to be less likely to fulfill their duties.50 And in a pair of 
cases from 2009, the Court added yet another concern supporting qualified 
immunity: Avoiding “disruptive discovery [in litigation],” the Court 
claimed, was the “basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine”51 and the 
“’driving force’ behind” the doctrine’s creation.52 
Thus, the practical concerns animating qualified immunity are (1) 
shielding officials from financial liability, (2) allowing officials to focus on 
public issues, (3) supporting citizens who wish to accept public office, (4) 
encouraging officials to fulfill their duties, and (5) protecting potential 
litigants from the burdens of discovery.53 
 
46.   Schwartz, How QI Fails, supra note 12, at 13. But see Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 885, 936–37 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification] 
(emphasizing that between 2006 and 2011, officers in the “largest jurisdictions . . . were personally 
responsible for just .02% [of damages] . . . in police misconduct suits” and, in small and mid-sized 
departments, her study showed that officers “paid nothing towards settlements and judgments entered 
against them”). 
47.   Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). 
48.   Schwartz, How QI Fails, supra note 12, at 13 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242 (municipalities); 
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (private prison guards); Wood v. Strickland, 420 
U.S. 308, 315 n.6 (1975) (equitable relief)). 
49.   Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
50.   Id. 
51.   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009). 
52.   Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
53.   Cf. John C. Jefferies, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 
99–100 (1999) (arguing that qualified immunity, by “reduc[ing] government’s incentives to avoid 
constitutional violations[,]” allows courts to “embrace [constitutional] innovation” and thus increase 
rights protection). But see supra text accompanying notes 36–42 (arguing that Pearson allows courts to 



















B. Common-Law Good-Faith Defense 
 
Before § 1983 or Bivens actions,54 constitutional-rights violations were 
brought via state common-law claims.55 For example, when citizens 
believed that their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, they would 
bring a state action for trespass against the federal agent.56 Then, the agent 
would claim federal supremacy to trump the state-law trespass.57 Finally, 
citizens would assert that any federal power was void because of the Fourth 
Amendment’s limitation on federal power.58 Section 1983 fundamentally 
transformed and simplified the morass and allowed citizens to bring suit 
directly against state agents for rights violations. But this shift raised 
questions about how the new statutory right worked with the old common-
law system or if the old system had any role at all.59 
In 1967, the Supreme Court, relying on the common law, declared for 
the first time that government officials were entitled to qualified 
immunity.60 In Pierson v. Ray, a group of “orderly and polite” African 
American clergymen was arrested in 1961 in Jackson, Mississippi, for 
entering a white-only waiting room at a bus terminal.61 The arrests were 
made under a Mississippi statute that was found to be unconstitutional in 
1965—four years after the incident.62 The Supreme Court equated the 
officers’ unconstitutional arrests to tort liability for false arrest and thus 
extended “the defense of good faith and probable cause . . . to [the officers] 
in the action under § 1983.”63 In other words, the common law required 
“excusing [the officers] from liability for acting under a statute that [they] 
reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional.”64 
Pierson specifically applied Mississippi common law in its analysis, but 
 
54.   See supra note 22 for a discussion of Bivens. 
55.   Baude, supra note 12, at 51. 
56.   Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1506 (1987). 
57.   Id. 
58.   Id. 
59.   Baude, supra note 12, at 52. 
60.   Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 
1801 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Case Against QI]; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
61.   Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 . 
62.   Id. at 550. 
63.   Id. at 557. 
64.   Id. at 555. 

















the Court has since taken a more encompassing approach and stated that 
qualified immunity is based on common-law defenses more broadly 
available in 1871—when Congress passed § 1983.65 In a 2012 case, Filarsky 
v. Delia, the Supreme Court again pointed to the common law to justify 
qualified immunity and extended its reach to private individuals hired 
temporarily or for a specific purpose by the government.66 The Court 
emphasized the applicability of common-law defenses available at the time 
§ 1983 was passed: 
Our decisions have recognized similar immunities under § 
1983, reasoning that common law protections “‘well 
grounded in history and reason’ had not been abrogated ‘by 
covert inclusion in the general language’ of § 1983.”67 
Thus, the Court relies on the traditional understanding of common 
law—that is, the common law as it stood in 1871.68 While the Court has 
often offered common law as qualified immunity’s base, it has conceded 
“that the precise contours of official immunity . . . [are not] derived from 
the often arcane rules of the common law.”69 Instead, a move from the 
common law “was justified by . . . special policy concerns.”70 
  
 
65.   Schwartz, Case Against QI, supra note 60, at 1801. 
66.   Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 393–94 (2012); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
247 (1974) (extending qualified immunity to executive branch officials). 
67.   Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 383–84. 
68.   Baude, supra note 12, at 54. But cf. Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 
with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 60–61 (1989) (reasoning that the Court 
has provided a “quite creative construction of § 1983’s text and history” and “pretended that only its 
chosen interpretation is consistent with § 1983’s text and history” even though “an opposite reading of 
§ 1983 is perfectly possible: The plain meaning of the statute’s explicit language implies an expansive 
liability with no common law defenses”). 
69.   Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644–45 (1987). 
70.   Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170–71 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (construing Anderson, 


















C. Equilibrium Adjustment 
 
The equilibrium-adjustment theory is rooted in Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Crawford-El v. Britton.71 The Court engages in equilibrium adjustment 
when it attempts to correct the effects of a faulty, old doctrine by inventing 
a new one, instead of simply fixing the old doctrine.72 In Crawford-El, 
Scalia stated that “qualified immunity under § 1983 has not purported to be 
faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when § 1983 was 
enacted.”73 Nevertheless, Scalia did not suggest revising qualified immunity 
to align with common-law immunities; instead, he declared that the 
abandonment of common-law principles was “perhaps just as well.”74 He 
justified this approach by arguing that the Court’s 1961 decision in Monroe 
v. Pape75 altered § 1983 so greatly that it “bears scant resemblance to what 
Congress enacted almost a century” before the decision.76 Scalia contended 
that the Court broadened § 1983 and “changed a statute that had generated 
only 21 cases in the first 50 years of its existence into one that pours into 
the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each year.”77 It was now up to 
the Court to engage “in the essentially legislative activity of crafting a 
sensible scheme of qualified immunities for the statute we have invented—
rather than applying the common law embodied in the statute that Congress 
wrote” to staunch the influx of cases it had caused.78 
Scalia’s response may seem bizarre considering his originalist 
interpretations79 but is unsurprising when compared to his opinions in 
 
71.   Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611–12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
72.   Baude, supra note 12, at 63. Baude adopts another term to refer to the equilibrium-adjustment 
theory: the two-wrongs-make-a-right theory. Id. at 62. Equilibrium adjustment has also been 
alternatively termed “compensating adjustments” by several scholars. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, 
Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 421 (2003) (stating “that multiple 
departures from the optimal or first-best constitutional arrangements might offset each other, producing 
compensating adjustments that ensure constitutional equilibrium”). 
73.   Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611. 
74.   Id. 
75.   Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See supra text accompanying notes 25–30 for a 
discussion regarding the Court’s decision in Monroe. Scalia agreed with the dissent in Monroe that 
“under color of” meant § 1983 applied only to violations pursuant to state law. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. 
at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
76.   Id. 
77.   Id. 
78.   Id. at 611–12. 
79.   But see Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921, 
1921 (2017) (“Justice Scalia famously described himself as a ‘faint-hearted originalist’ who would 

















Bivens cases.80 Scalia believed that “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in 
which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of 
action[,]” but because of Bivens’s importance and long-standing 
application, he thought Bivens should be applied narrowly instead of 
overturned.81 In the same way that Scalia believed Bivens should stand, he 
believed qualified immunity’s departure from the common law was 
acceptable to fix the Court’s earlier miscues that were heavily relied upon. 
 
D. Lenity and Fair Warning  
 
The Court has also justified qualified immunity by invoking the 
doctrine of lenity. The doctrine of lenity is predominately confined to 
criminal proceedings,82 but the Supreme Court has equated the doctrines of 
lenity and fair warning to qualified immunity.83 This thread begins with a 
criminal statute passed by the Reconstruction Congress in 1866 that is 
comparable to § 1983. 18 U.S.C. § 242 makes anyone acting “under color 
of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom” who “willfully 
subjects any person in any State . . . to the deprivations of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States” criminally liable.84 
Before the Court ever applied qualified immunity, it tackled the 
vagueness question of § 242. In Screws v. United States, a plurality on the 
Court narrowly defined § 242 to avoid vagueness principles.85 The Court 
 
abandon the historical meaning when following it was intolerable.”). 
80.   Baude, supra note 12, at 63. Bivens created a federal equivalent of § 1983 actions. Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens actions are 
entirely judicially created, while § 1983 was statutorily enacted. 
81.   Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia 
seems to have won the battle that Bivens should be narrowly limited. The Court has since declared that 
“it is possible that the analysis in the Court’s three Bivens cases might have been different if they were 
decided today.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017). 
82.   Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (2002) 
(calling the lenity doctrine “one of the oldest and most ‘venerable’ canons of statutory interpretation” in 
criminal law). 
83.   Baude, supra note 12, at 71. 
84.   18 U.S.C. § 242 (2017). 
85.   Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 100 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[If § 242] is confined 
more narrowly . . . it can be preserved as one of the sanctions to the great rights which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to secure.”). Although Justice Douglas’s opinion was only joined by a 
plurality, subsequent cases have adopted his opinion as controlling. Baude, supra note 12, at 71; see 


















first construed “willful” acts as only those when officials act with “specific 
intent” while being “aware that what he does is precisely that which the 
statue forbids.”86 Thus, the Court stated that for officials to be liable, the 
rights within the meaning of § 242 must be “made definite by decision or 
other rule of law.”87 But in construing “under color of,” the Court relatively 
quickly and without much discussion allowed the statute to apply where a 
state official violated state law.88 
While it might be expected that the Court’s fair warning and lenity 
analysis would be confined to the criminal statute § 242, it has, at times, 
extended the same reasoning to § 1983 cases and qualified-immunity 
defenses. In United States v. Lanier, a § 242 case, the Court reasoned that 
“the qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning 
standard to give officials . . . the same protection from civil liability and its 
consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of 
vague criminal statutes.”89 And again, in the § 1983 case Hope v. Pelzer,90 
the Court explicitly stated that “[o]fficers sued in a civil action for damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants 
charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C. § 242.”91 
 
E. Stare Decisis  
 
The doctrine of stare decisis places a heavy emphasis on precedent and 
requires courts to “follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points 
arise again.”92 But the Court does not hold unswervingly to the doctrine 
when there are sufficiently persuasive reasons to depart from past 
decisions.93 Stare decisis, however, is given greater weight when the Court 
engages in statutory interpretation, as opposed to constitutional 
interpretation.94 
 
86.   Screws, 325 U.S. at 104 (plurality opinion). 
87.   Id. at 103. This language shadows the “clearly established rights” principle in § 1983 qualified-
immunity cases. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (stating that officials are not liable 
under § 1983 when they have not “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights”). 
88.   Screws, 325 U.S. at 108–09. 
89.   Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270–71. 
90.   Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
91.   Id. at 739. 
92.   Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016). 
93.   Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U.L. REV. 789, 790 (2018). 
94.   Nielson & Walker, supra note 11, at 1856. 

















The Supreme Court has adopted this heightened form of stare decisis 
when interpreting statutes because a statutory interpretation “effectively 
become[s] part of the statutory scheme, . . . [and is subject] to congressional 
change. Absent special justification, they are balls tossed into Congress’s 
court.”95 The Court has also noted that when Congress has had opportunities 
to reverse the Court’s interpretation but has not done so, the force of 
statutory stare decisis is even stronger.96 Since the Court enacted the 
modern, objective-based qualified-immunity regime in Harlow almost four 
decades ago,97 Congress has amended § 1983 and added qualified immunity 
in several other sections of the United States Code.98 
Furthermore, the Court does not evaluate policy concerns when 
statutory stare decisis is raised.99 For example, in the context of statutory 
stare decisis, the Court has declined to overrule a statutory interpretation 
when presented with economic analysis even though the Court saw “no 
error in [the] analysis.”100 The Court instead believes that when such policy 
issues are at stake, “Congress is the right entity to fix it.”101 
Finally, while the Court may be wary of changing qualified immunity’s 
substantive jurisprudence because it is based in the statutory interpretation 
of § 1983, the Court is less concerned with altering qualified immunity’s 
procedural requirements.102 In fact, the Court has already freely changed the 




95.   Kimble v. Marvel Entm’tEnt., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015). 
96.   Id. at 456. At the same time, the Court is sometimes wary of assigning meaning to 
Congressional inaction because of the harm it may pose to the separation of powers. Matthew Baker, 
The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial Distortion of the Legislative-Executive Balance of Power, 
2009 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 225, 251 (2009) (“Due to the delicate nature of judicial responsibility in this area, 
courts should refrain whenever possible from giving positive meaning to congressional inaction.”).  
97.   Cf. Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2011) (reasoning that when Congress had 
acquiesced to the Court’s statutory interpretation for only fourteen years, the Court’s interpretation had 
great stare-decisis force). 
98.   Nielson & Walker, supra note 11, at 1858. 
99.   Id. at 1876. 
100.   Kimble, 576 U.S. at 461. 
101.   Id. at 462. 
102.   Nielson & Walker, supra note 11, at 1860. 
103.   Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233–34 (2009) (stating that stare decisis has no bearing 
when a procedural “rule is judge made and implicates an important matter involving internal Judicial 


















II. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL  
 
A. Monroe v. Pape Decision  
 
The Court’s 1961 decision in Monroe altered the understanding of § 
1983 that had prevailed for the ninety years after the statute’s enactment. 
Section 1983 has, as Scalia noted, “pour[ed] into the federal courts tens of 
thousands of suits each year.”104 In 1961, there were only 296 civil-rights 
cases brought in federal court; that number rose to 35,307 by 2013.105 The 
Court’s expansive interpretation in Monroe knocked over the first domino 
in a long line of unfortunate decisions that has led to modern qualified 
immunity’s extensive application. 
The Monroe majority relied heavily on § 1983’s legislative history to 
determine the scope of “under color of.”106 The Court determined Congress 
had three purposes when it enacted § 1983: (1) to override state laws 
depriving citizens of their rights,107 (2) to provide a remedy when state law 
was legally inadequate, and (3) to provide a federal remedy when a state 
remedy was inadequate in practice even if it was adequate in theory.108 
This third purpose was the Court’s driving point, but the Court’s 
solution leapfrogged adequate-in-practice state remedies and allowed all 
suits directly into federal court. After quoting a litany of legislative history 
that the Court claimed showed § 1983 should be read broadly, the majority 
epitomized its selection of debate quotes with one by Senator Thurman. 
 
104.   Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 994 
(7th ed. 2015) (“But the overall number of civil rights actions has risen markedly [since Monroe], with 
§ 1983 cases accounting for a large if uncertain percentage of the increase.”). 
105.   FALLON ET AL., supra note 104. 
106.   Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961). 
107.   Here, the Court quoted Senator Sloss from Alabama. Id. at 173. Although Sloss’s comment 
supports this point, it also cuts against the Court’s third claim that the federal courts would be allowed 
to provide a remedy when the state remedy was inadequate in practice. The statute’s language seemingly 
did not cause Sloss to believe that the federal courts would have primary jurisdiction when a state official 
violated state law: 
[Section 1983] prohibits any invidious legislation by States against the rights or 
privileges of citizens of the United States. The object of this section is not very 
clear, as it is not pretended by its advocates on this floor that any State has passed 
any laws endangering the rights or privileges of the colored people. 
Id. at 173. 
108.   Id. at 174. 

















Senator Thurman stated that § 1983 “authorizes any person who is deprived 
of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of 
the United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal 
courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in 
controversy.”109 This supposedly proved Congress’s intent to allow suits 
against officials even when they acted in violation of state law. 
The majority also relied on its construction of § 1983’s criminal-law 
counterpart. Twenty years before Monroe was decided and seventy years 
after § 1983 was enacted, the Court held that “under color of” in the criminal 
provision 18 U.S.C. § 242 applied to any “[m]isuse of power, possessed by 
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 
with the authority of state law.”110 This meant that any government actor, 
whether or not they were acting pursuant to a state law, could be tried in 
federal court.111 The Court reasoned that the same construction must be 
given to both § 1983 and § 242.112 
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, argued that § 1983’s plain language, 
litigation history, and legislative history failed to support the majority’s 
construction. Frankfurter explained that for the first seventy years after § 
1983’s enactment, “under color of” was read to require a depriver of rights 
to be acting in accordance with state laws or customs that had the force of 
law.113 During that time, no § 1983 case had come before the Supreme Court 
arguing that “under color of” state law applied to any state official’s action, 
and in only two suits in the lower courts was that broad application 
argued.114 Decided only three years after § 1983 was enacted, one of these 
lower-court cases, United States v. Jackson, held that for state officials to 
be acting “under color of some [state] law, statute, order or custom,” they 
must be acting “within the provisions of the state law.”115 The Monroe Court 
engaged in a “revolutionary turnabout” from the historical understanding of 
 
109.   Id. at 179–80. 
110.   Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).  
111.   Id. 
112.   Id. at 185 (“[I]t is beyond doubt that this phrase should be accorded the same construction in 
both statutes . . . .”). 
113.   Id. at 213–16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
114.   Id. 
115.   United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 563, 564 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874). In the other case, § 1983 
was held to not apply “to instances of lawless police brutality, although the ruling was not put on ‘under 
color’ grounds.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 214–15 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Brawner v. Irvin, 169 


















“under color of” when it had interpreted § 242.116 
Frankfurter also denied that the § 242 precedents were applicable 
because the Court had only passingly considered the meaning of “under 
color of.”117 He counseled that “under color of” should be examined in a 
new light with a renewed emphasis on the legislative history, even while 
acknowledging that stare decisis might be implicated.118 Before analyzing 
the legislative history of § 1983, Frankfurter made a final appeal to set aside 
stare decisis because the precedent’s construction of “under color of” 
“ignores the meaning fairly comported by the words of the text and 
confirmed by the legislative history.”119 
Frankfurter contended that the legislative history pointed in the opposite 
direction of the majority’s position. For example, Senator Edmunds stated 
that § 1983 gives federal protection when there are “any offenses against a 
citizen in a State . . . ‘unless the criminal who shall commit those offenses 
is punished and the person who suffers receives that redress.’”120 This 
implies that if a state properly punished an official for violating an 
individual’s rights under state law, then there would be no federal cause of 
action.121 Representative Garfield also supported the bill as it would 
“preserve intact the autonomy of the States, the machinery of the State 
governments, and the municipal organizations established under State 
law.”122 But under the majority’s construction of “under color of”, state 
governments no longer have primary authority, except the residuary power 
 
116.   Monroe, 365 U.S. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
117.   Id. at 220–21. 
118.   Id. at 221. 
119.   Id. at 223. See SAM GLUCKSBERG, UNDERSTANDING FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 97 (2001) for a 
study showing that almost all lay citizens understand “under color of law” in plain language as 
Frankfurter suggests. 
120.   Monroe, 365 U.S. at 228–29 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 
1st Sess. 697 (1871) (statement of Sen. Edmunds)). 
121.   Justice Gorsuch argued similarly in a pair of cases while sitting on the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, urging that federal courts should sometimes abstain from ruling on § 1983 claims when state 
law adequately protects the plaintiff: “[W]hile Monroe v. Pape has read [federal courts’] authorization 
broadly, the authority to remedy a claim doesn’t always mean the duty to do so.” Browder v. City of 
Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorusch, J., concurring) (citations omitted). He 
further explained that “when a rogue state official acting in defiance of state law causes a constitutional 
injury there’s every reason to suppose an established state tort law remedy would do as much as a novel 
federal remedy might and no reason exists to duplicate the effort.” Id. at 1084 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 
451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981)). Abstaining when state law protects plaintiffs is proper “out of respect for 
considerations of judicial modesty, efficiency, federalism, and comity.” Cordova v. City of 
Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 664 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
122.   Id. at 229. 

















to hear federal claims. This was contrary to the intentions of at least two 
members of Congress who supported the law.123 
The legislative history, however, was more ambiguous than either the 
dissent or majority conceded.124 The legislative history should not have been 
conclusive in either direction, as Justice Harlan, concurring with the 
majority, pointed out. Harlan took a more tempered approach and relied on 
stare decisis.125 Although the Court had already construed “under color of” 
in § 242, the language of § 242 and § 1983 are almost identical. 
Additionally, the meaning of § 242 was decided twenty years before 
Monroe—not an insignificant length of time for precedent to cement. 
Harlan took the appropriate approach and applied stare decisis to § 1983. 
Even though Frankfurter’s interpretation of “under color of” was correct, 
stare decisis should apply since the doctrine is especially powerful in 
statutory interpretation because Congress can fix any flaws it sees with the 
Court’s interpretation.126 
It has been almost a century since Monroe’s misinterpretation. Now, the 
ball is in Congress’s court to rebuff the Court’s error. Congress should 
amend § 1983 to overrule Monroe and adopt Justice Frankfurter’s 
interpretation by making “under color of” state law apply only to cases 
where a state official is acting pursuant to unconstitutional state laws, not 
where state officials are acting ultra vires. This will result in (1) a return to 
a more appropriate federal-state balance by slowing the flow of § 1983 suits 
when suits could appropriately be brought under state law in a state court 
and (2) a stronger reliance on state common-law defenses instead of federal 
qualified immunity when suits are brought in state court. 
One argument against this approach is that trial juries and judges at the 
state level may not protect an individual’s rights as well as federal courts 
would.127 While this argument might seem persuasive, it doesn’t hold water. 
 
123.   But one must be careful from inferring much from Congressional intent because there is no 
single purpose driving every member of Congress. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 
“They,” not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (explaining 
that there is no overarching Congressional intent, only individual Congress members’ preferences). 
124.   Monroe, 365 U.S. at 193 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
125.   Id. at 192. 
126.   See supra text accompanying notes 92–96. 
127.   E.g., an African American in Mississippi during the early 1900s is lynched by whites. Even if 
lynchings were technically illegal in the state, white juries may rarely pass judgment on the white 



















Section 1983 not only applies when state officials act “under color of any 
statute” but also to state officials acting “under color of any . . . custom, or 
usage, of any State.”128 Thus, § 1983 would still allow plaintiffs to sue in 
federal courts when the state official’s action is technically against state law 
but the conduct is “engaged in ‘permanently and as a rule,’ or 
‘systematically,’” so that it has the force of law.129 Under this interpretation, 
if state jury outcomes systematically deprive an individual’s rights, that 
deprivation would be a state custom or usage, and the individual could bring 
suit under § 1983.130 In other words, plaintiffs could sue in federal court if 
a state remedy is inadequate in practice, even if adequate in theory. 
And if more cases are brought in state courts under violations of state 
law, instead of under § 1983, courts will be free to apply state common-law 
defenses instead of the judicially created qualified immunity. This approach 
will not impede the Court’s practical concerns—holding public officials 
accountable versus shielding them from harassment, distraction, and 
liability—because state officials will presumably be more aware of their 
state’s laws than they would be of unclear and unestablished constitutional 
rights. 
B. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
 
Modern qualified immunity has drifted far from its common-law 
moorings. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court established a new standard for 
applying qualified immunity.131 In Harlow, the Court held that officials 
were protected by qualified immunity as long “as their conduct does not 
 
128.   42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017). 
129.   Monroe, 365 U.S. at 236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Browder v. City of 
Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1084 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that although 
federal courts should abstain from § 1983 cases more often, if a state is “maintaining facially adequate 
law on the books but acting discriminatorily in practice, the federal court must hear the case”).  
130.   See also Rutherglen, supra note 30, at 976–77 (arguing that “‘custom’ and ‘usage’” should be 
viewed as it is “in other areas of law: that official policy combines with private practice to determine 
how the law actually operates”). Furthermore, this interpretation does not cause the statute to have 
superfluous language. Under the Monroe majority’s interpretation, Congress’s specified categories of 
state action (i.e., “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage”) mean little. The 
Monroe majority’s reinterpretation of § 1983 could just has easily have read: “Every [state official] who 
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thererof to the deprivation of any rights . . . .” No “under color of” needed. The Monroe 
Court, by subsuming all state officials’ actions regardless of its legality within the state, removed all 
meaning from Congress’s express language. 
131.   Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 

















violate clearly established [law] . . . of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”132 This change greatly expanded qualified immunity’s reach 
from what it had been—a common-law good-faith defense only. 
The Court should return to the common-law good-faith qualified 
immunity. Qualified immunity would thus be unavailable when “an official 
‘knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took . . . would 
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with 
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury . . . .’”133 Qualified immunity would then only be available when both 
of the following are true: (1) the official had no knowledge or reason to 
know his action would deprive a person of rights and (2) the official had no 
intent to deprive a person of rights. 
But the Court did not leave the common law behind without thought. 
The Court held that good-faith qualified immunity was incompatible with 
policy considerations required to balance the need to hold officials 
accountable and shield them from frivolous suits.134 It has identified five 
costs of litigation: financial liability, distracting officials from their duties, 
inhibiting discretionary action, deterring people from public service, and 
burdensome discovery costs.135  
These concerns, while valid, would have far less weight if Congress 
restored the original meaning of § 1983.136 If Congress restored the state-
federal balance that existed before Monroe, there would be far fewer § 1983 
cases and less need for the federal courts to protect officials from the costs 
the Court identified. Fewer suits means less financial costs, fewer 
distractions from duties, fewer inhibitions of discretion, less deterrence of 
people seeking public office, and less discovery costs. To be sure, more 
cases would “requir[e] resolution by a jury”137 than modern qualified 
immunity requires, but a return to good-faith qualified immunity would 
restore the balance between holding officials accountable and protecting 
them from burdensome litigation. 
 
132.   Id. at 818. 
133.   Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). 
134.   Id. at 816; see also supra text accompanying notes 45–53. Presumably, the Court has had to 
give greater weight to protection because of the influx of § 1983 cases after Monroe. 
135.   See supra Section I.A. 
136.   Although returning to a good-faith qualified immunity that is rooted in the common law is the 
proper course regardless of Congress’s action or inaction, I will focus on the effects of overturning 
Harlow assuming that Congress restores § 1983 to its original meaning. 


















On the other hand, the financial cost to individual officials may 
increase. In § 1983 actions, officials rarely pay out of pocket for judgments 
against them.138 Under a good-faith qualified immunity, officials would be 
less likely to be indemnified because there is a greater focus on subjective 
motives. In many jurisdictions, the governing law does not allow 
indemnification of officials who act in bad faith.139 Since overturning 
Harlow would make good faith a threshold question to granting qualified 
immunity, more juries may determine that officials did not act in good faith. 
Then, the official would not be indemnified and would be personally liable 
for damages. But only bad actors would be personally liable, so the financial 
costs against the officials would be justified. Officials who did not act in 
bad faith would still be indemnified. 
Returning to the pre-Harlow qualified immunity will not topple the 
Court’s balancing act between holding officials accountable and shielding 
them from frivolous suits. In fact, good-faith qualified immunity would 
restore the proper balance Congress intended when it passed § 1983.140 
Additionally, Scalia’s Crawford-El equilibrium-adjustment argument, 
which contends that the Supreme Court was right to incorrectly interpret 
qualified immunity because Monroe was incorrect, would be void. Still 
assuming Congress returns § 1983 to its original meaning, the statute would 
again resemble what Congress passed in 1871. Thus, it would be appropriate 
to apply the “normal common-law rules”141 and return to the pre-Harlow 
good-faith qualified immunity that was more squarely based in the common 
law. The Court would no longer have to engage “in the essentially 
legislative activity of crafting a sensible scheme of qualified immunit[y]”142 
because there would no longer be a need to right the wrong of Monroe. 
  
 
138.   Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 46. 
139.   Id. at 920–21. 
140.   See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (2020), for five 
predictions about what litigation would look like with no qualified immunity, instead of a good-faith 
qualified immunity: (1) clarified constitutional rights, (2) litigation success rates consistent with modern 
qualified-immunity levels, (3) decreased litigation costs, (4) more suits filed, and (5) limited impact on 
law enforcement decision-making. Although based on the abolition of qualified immunity, Schwartz’s 
predictions are also applicable to this Note’s analysis. 
141.   Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
142.   Id. at 611–12. 



















The current “yes harm, no foul” imbalance leaves victims violated but 
not vindicated; wrongs are not righted, wrongdoers are not reproached, 
and those wronged are not redressed.143 
 
There should be some change to the judicial system’s application of 
qualified immunity for state officials because “[i]t is indeed curious how 
qualified immunity excuses constitutional violations by limiting the statute 
Congress passed to redress constitutional violations.”144 The best way to 
curb the expansive defense is to reinstate the original applicability of § 1983 
and returning to a common-law understanding of qualified immunity. This 
one-two punch will preserve the Court’s goal of keeping officials 
accountable while protecting officials from burdensome litigation, and it 
will better serve justice for those whose rights have been violated. 
Remember Andrew Lee Scott? If qualified immunity was as it was 
intended to be, the officer who shot and killed Andrew and who was at the 
wrong house without a search warrant would not have evaded liability so 
easily. First, the case likely would not have been brought in federal court 
under § 1983 but in state court under Florida law. The officer would thus 
have been unable to assert qualified immunity as a defense and would have 
had only Florida defenses available, just like any other defendant. Second, 
even if the case could have been brought under § 1983, the officer would 
have had to prove the more rigorous, pre-Harlow qualified immunity 
standard instead of showing there was no clearly established law that 
prohibited him from his dubious warrantless search. 
Although for Andrew and his family the time has passed to restore the 
qualified-immunity balance, there is still time for those whose rights have 
not yet been violated. Congress and the Supreme Court should reevaluate 
modern qualified immunity in search of a better solution
 
143.   Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (2018) (Willet, J., concurring dubitante). 
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